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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

P. JAMES COLEMAN,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

R. EARL DILLMAN,

16666
16926

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION BELOW
P. James Coleman is appealling from two adverse judgments
rendered by the Third District Court in separate actions.

In

case number 16666, after trial to the bench, Judge David K.
Winder entered a judgment denying Coleman specific performance
of an alleged oral contract for the sale of land.

In case

number 16926, after submission of the matter on stipulated
facts, Judge Jay E. Banks entered judgment granting R. Earl
Dillman damages and possession of certain real property on
his Complaint against Coleman for unlawful detainer.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have both judgments entered below
affirmed by this Court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The factual contentions of the parties in case number 16;
are entirely at odds and appellant's statement of the facts,
while accurately representing his contentions at trial, fail
to acknowledge the evidence upon which the judgment in that
action was based and require supplementation as follows:
P. James Coleman moved into a home owned by R. Earl
in late January of 1975.

Oil~

While Coleman testified that he

in after reaching an oral agreement to purchase

t~e

mo~

property

for $36,000.00, to be paid in monthly installments of $303.29
at 3 1/2 or 9 percent interest, Dillman testified that he mer'
agreed to rent Coleman the property while he was attempting
to sell it i f Coleman would make payments of $303.29 per
month.

(R.

llO)

The rental payment was the same as the

previous tenant had been paying and was equal to the amount
Dillman paid monthly on a Deed of Trust to First Security
Bank covering the property.

(R. 108)

At the time Coleman moved in the home was listed for sal:
through a realtor for $45,000.00 and was being advertised for
sale during the first three months of Coleman's occuoancy.
(R. 157)

Coleman and his co-tenant, however, kept removing t:

"for sale" signs from the property.

(R. 105, 158)

Coleman was deliquent in making his monthly payment from
the inception of his occupancy and his payments, when offered,
were frequently made with checks drawn on insufficient funds.
(R. 111, exhibit P-2)

Whe he did make payments he was issued
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receipts with the notation of "rent" in them (exhibits P-3,4,5)
which he acknowledged he altered prior to trial to eliminate the
reference to rent.

(R. 42)

While there was dispute regarding what was paid, both parties
acknowledged that in November of 1976 a note was signed by
Coleman in favor of Dillman which acknowledged that as of 11/7/76
$3,633.00 "rent" was due (R. 116-17, 173), though Coleman at
some time before trial corssed out the word "rent" on the
document.

(R. 174)

After December of 1976, Coleman ceased

making any monthly payments.

(R. 20, 30-32, 62-63)

Dillman

repeatedly requested rent payments (R. 112, 113, 121, 158,
exhibit D-20), but Coleman put him off with representations
that he would be inhereting a large sum of cash in the near
future from which accounts could be settled.

(R.

113)

Finally, on June 5, 1978, Mr. Dillman had Mr. Coleman
served with a formal notice to pay rent due or quit the premises.
(R. 27)

Coleman responded by filing an action for specific

performance two days later (R. 2-3), which is the basis of case
number 16666, and Mr. Dillman filed a Complaint for unlawful
detainer (R. 4) before being served with Coleman's Complaint.
The two actions were consolidated for trial purposes but were
severed again when the Court ruled that one (16666) was not
triable to a jury and the other (16926) was.
ceeded to trial on August 8, 1979,
rendered against Coleman.

Case 16666 pro-

with a judgment being

On January 24, 1980 case 16926

came up for jury trial but the parties stipulated to the facts,
based largely on the court's earlier decision that no enforceable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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contract existed between the parties, and a judgment awardin:
damages and possession of the property was rendered for Mr.
Dillman.

(R.

42)

As the appellant only raises issues concerned with thet
of case 16666, this brief will be confined to discussion of
that action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
REQUEST FOR A JURY TRIAL IN HIS ACTION FOR
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
It is settled law in this jurisdiction that an action

~

specific performance of an alleged oral contract for the sale
of any interest in real property, based upon a claim of part
performance of the contract, is purely equitable in nature ar.
that no cause of action at law is even stated by a Complaint
which seeks money damages for the alleged breach of such an
oral contract.

In Baugh v. Darlev, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335

(1947), this Court stated unequivocally that the doctrine whe:
by part performance of an oral agreement for the sale of lane
might operate to avoid the affect of the statute of frauds
was solely a creation of equity and had no application in
an action at law.
The basis of the doctrine originally was that
equity would not permit the statute to be used
as an instrument for the perpetration of a
fraud.
The doctrine is now firmly established
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in the rules of equity jurisprudence of both
England and most of our states.
It is almost
equally well established that the doctrine
is purely equitable in nature, and has no
place in an action at law.
184 P.2d at 337.
It is equally well established that a party to an action
which is primarily equitable in nature has no right to trial
of that case before a jury, and that the trial court is vested
with broad discretion in making the determination of whether
or not an action is equitable or legal.

In Sweeney v. Hapoy

Vallev, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126 (1966), this Court
upheld the trial court's denial of a jury trial in a case invalving mixed issues of law and equity by noting that
In circumstances where doubt exists as
to whether the cause should be regarded as
one in equity, or one in law wherein the
party can insist on a jury as a matter of right,
the trial court should have some latitude of
discretion.
In making that determination it
is not bound by the ostensible form of the
action, nor by the particular wording of. the
pleadings.
It may examine into the nature
of the rights asserted and the remedies sought
in the light of the facts of the case to ascertain which predominates; and from that
determination make the appropriate order as
to a jury of non-jury trial.
The fact that
the division of court hearing the pre-trial
indicates that the case is set for a trial by
jury is entitled to some consideration and should
not be countermanded without good reason.
Nevertheless it is the prerogative of the judge
who actually tries the case to make the determination.
Unless it is shown that the ruling
was patently in error or an abuse of discretion,
this court will not interfere with the ruling
thereon.
18 Utah 2d at 117.

See also, Norback v. Board of Directors of
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Church Extension Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P.2d 339

(1934).

In the instant case, where the complaint seeks specific performance, there is no question that the primary thrust of the
action is equitable and that no right to jury trial attaches.
This Court has previously held that there is no right to jur1·
trial in an action for specific performance on a real estate
contract.

Bradshaw v. Kershaw,

529 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974).

This decision is in accord with those rendered in all jurisdictions which have considered the question.
v. Dellacroce, 169 Colo. 212, 454 P.2d 804

See, e.g. , Set:

(1969); Moun-

tain View Corp. v. Horne, 74 N.M. 541, 395 P.2d 676

(1964);

Phillies v. Johnson, 266 Or. 544, 514 P.2d 1337 (1973);
Goodson v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 243 P.2d 163, rehearing deniec
69 Wyo. 439, 244 P.2d 805 (1952).
The only authority cited by the appellant for the conte
that the denial of a jury trial was error is Willard
Investment Co. v. Cox, 580 P.2d 607
wholly inapposite here.

~-

MilM

(Utah 1978), which case:

That case was tried to a jury

without objection by either party even though, as an equity
case, the jury was not a matter of right.

This Court merely

noted that, under Rule 39(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a case in which trial by jury doesn't exist as a
matter of right but which is tried to a jury by mutual

cons~
. I

should be governed by the same rules applicable to jury tna.
generally.

In this action the respondent filed a specific

objection to the jury setting (R. 44) and the Cox decision ha
no bearing to the issues presented herein.
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The clear law of this jurisdiction, and that of all others
employing similar rules of procedure, is that no right of trial
by jury exists in an action for specific performance and the
court below did not err in so ruling.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE APPELLANT
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A DECREE OF
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
In the Findings in case number 16666, the District Court
noted that it was not necessary to even reach the question of
whether or not there was an oral contract for the purchase and
sale of the subject property because the evidence presented by
the appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient performance on
his part to raise any equities in his favor even if there was
a contract as he alleged.

This finding is wholly supported by

the evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal.
It is undisputed that Mr. Coleman had no written agreement
signed by Mr. Dillman sufficient to satisfy the relevant requirements of Utah's Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. §35-5-3
(1953), which provides that:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of
any lands, or any interest in lands, shall
be void unless the contract, or same note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed
by the party by whom the lease or sale is
to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
(emphasis added)
Coleman asserted, however, that his part performance of
the alleged contract was sufficient to allow for an equitable
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decree of specific performance.

To evaluate this claim in

light of the evidence presented at trial it is important to
bear in mind the purpose of this equitable exception to the
operation of the statute of frauds and the quality and
quantity of proof required of the party urging it.
It has long been recognized that the part performance
doctrine was created by equity to prevent a seller from

usi~

the statute of frauds to invalidate agreements under which

~

purchaser had taken substantial steps to carry out his porti:
of the contract and materially changed his position in
upon

~~e

clearly established terms of such agreement.

The

purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the statute from
used as a tool to defraud an unwary purchaser.

rel~

bei~

However, it

has also been historically acknowledged that this equitable
doctrine will no provide the basis for relief in cases when
the purchaser's efforts and expenditures on the subject
do not at least equal the value he has recieved from

p~~

posses~

and use of such property and operation of the statute does
not work any hardship upon him.
In Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 P. 262 (19221
this Court considered a case wherein the alleged contract
purchaser had held possession of the property for four years
during which time he had made monthly payments and some rnino:
improvements on the land.

The Court, in reversing a decree

of specific performance, noted that the total of the buyer's

-8-
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alleged payments and improvements did not equal the undisputed
rental value of the property during his period of possession
and held, therefore, that there was an insufficient equitable
basis to support an order of specific performance.
In view of this feature of the case, it cannot
be successfully contended that plaintiff's reliance on the statute of frauds as a bar in
the instant case operates as a fraud against
the defendant.
He has to all appearances been
the gainer in the transaction instead of a
loser, even if a decree had been entered in
favor of the plaintiff.
59 Utah at 585.
This formulation of the requirements for specific performance is in accord with Utah's first major decision concerning
the part performance doctrine, Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86,
86 P. 767 (1906), wherein the Court held that the acts of
part performance, if not at least the equivalent the value
received by possession of the property, would not provide a
basis for specific enforcement of an oral agreement.
[I]t must appear that the improvements, relied
upon as part performance are of a character
permanently beneficial to the land and involving
a sacrifice to him who made them because and
in reliance of the [contract].
If he has
gained more by the possession and use of the
land than he has lost by his improvements, or
if he has been fully compensated for the improvements, they will not be available to him
as a ground for specific performance.
31 Utah at 99.
It was precisely this logic upon which the trial court
relied in denying Mr. Coleman's claim for specific performance
without even having to reach the question of the existence of a
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contract.

Because, as the Court found, the sum of all payme;

and improvements made by Coleman during his period of posses:
was substantially less than the reasonable rental value of
the property during that period there was simply no equity
favoring plaintiff and the operation of the statute of limit
in voiding any alleged oral contract could not operate as a
fraud upon him.
This conclusion was clearly supported by the evidence
showing that the defendant resided for over four years in
a home with an undisputed rental value of over $300.00 a mon:
and during that time
31

mont~s

he made no monthly payment for the las:

of occupancy and was already deliquent in payment.

the amount of $3,633.00 dollars prior to that time (R. 244,
exhibit P-7), resulting in a total deficiency of approximate.
$14,000 as of the time of trial.

Even if the value of his

alleged improvements is accepted as represented, this total
is less than $1,000.00 and the equities still oppose

grant~

any relief even if an oral agreement is assumed.
In a comprehensive study published in the Utah Law Reiv1
concerning the doctrine of part performance as it applies to
oral land contract in Utah, it was noted that before specif~
performance of an oral agreement can be justified the party
seeking such enforcement must be in compliance with the te~'
of the contract respecting his part of the bargain.
writer pointed out:
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As the

Although payment of consideration is
not a requisite of the part performance doctrine, it is a requisite for specific performance.
This is based on the equitable maxim
that a plaintiff who seeks equity must do
equity.
In a case where the performance
promised by the plaintiff would not consitute
equitable consideration, the court may even
require modification of the original terms
of the agreement, such as additional consideration by the plaintiff, before granding
specific performance.
Note, The Doctrine of Part Performance as Applied to Oral
Contracts in Utah, 9 Utah Law Rev. 91, 94 n.24 (1964).
It is axiomatic that any party seeking specific enforcement
of a real estate contract bears the burden of showing that he
has performed in conformity with the terms of the agreement
he alleges before a court of equity will compel performance by
the other party.

Lincoln Land and Development Co. v. Thompson,

26 Utah 2d 234, 489 P.2d 426 (1971).

Far from establishing

such fact, the evidence offered in this case shows that Mr.
Coleman was in substantial default of the terms of the agreement he alleged he had made with Mr. Dillman, both at the time
his action was filed and for years preceding that date.

Coleman

seeks to avoid that default by asserting that he made a tender
sufficient to excuse his performance, which assertion is
clearly not supported by the facts established at trial.
Appellant's allegation that he tendered the purchase price
is predicated upon certain efforts he made to get a loan.
The testimony was clear, however, that he never obtained any
funds to pay off the alleged balance and he never tendered any
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such amount of cash.

This Court has previously noted that

"tender requires that there be a bona fide,

unconditional ob

of payment of the amount of money due, coupled with an actua:
production of the money or its equivalent."

Zion's

Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975).
was made in this case.

Propert~

No such offw

Mr. Coleman simply applied for a loat

of $43, 000. 00 to pay off the home, which loan was never made,
among

other reasons, because there was no written agreement

evidencing that Mr. Coleman had any interest in the property.
(R.

168)
~ppellant's

assertion that Mr. Dillman was somehow ob-

ligated to take steps to assist Mr. Coleman to perform his po:
of the alleged contract, and that his failure to do so
relieves Coleman of his duty to perform, it unsupported by
any authority and is contrary to law.

There was absolutely

no testimony presented by Mr. Coleman that performance of bE
alleged contract was to result in his receiving a warranty
with covenants of title.

~

Even under his version of the cont

the agreement was merely that Mr. Dillman would "sell" him
the property.

Had such an agreement been cornrni tted to writi:.

as a conveyance, no warranties would be thereby created by ~
plication and no duty to convey "clear title" would arise.
The words 'give, grant, sell, and convey,' or
equivalent expressions in a conveyance, do
not of themselves imply a covenant of warranty or of title,
At common law,
neither a covenant of seisin, nor a covenant

-12-
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against encumbrances is implied in a deed of real
property by the use of the words 'grant, bargain,
sell, convey, and warrant.'
20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions §13
at 586

(1965).

Therefore, the assertion by appellant that "in a purchase
of real estate the seller has the obligation to deliver clear
title," Brief of Appellant at pg. 6, is incorrect and the
argument built on that premise is without force.
In Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah
1975) , this Court set forth the requirements for specific
performance of an oral real estate contract as follows:
The oral contract and its terms must be
clear, definite, mutually understood, and established by clear, unequivocal and definite
testimony, or other evidence of the same
quality.
In addition, there must be acts of
part performance which in equity are considered
sufficient to take the case out of the statute
of frauds:
(1) Any improvements made must be
substantial, or valuable, or beneficial.
(2)
A valuable consideration is demanded by equity.
(3) If there is possession, such possession must
be actual, open definite not concurrent with
the vendor, but it must be with the consent
of the vendor.
(4) Such acts as are relied on
must be exclusively referable to the contract.
534 P. 2d at 614.
Under this standard, the relatively trivial improvements
made by the appellant could not qualify as sufficient to
constitute part performance.

The testimony from Mr. Coleman

was that in four years he put in some grass at a cost of
$25.20 (exhibit P-9, R. 17-18), replaced four windows
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at a cost of $205.70 (exhibit P-8, R. 16-17), did
a furnace at a total cost of $133.63

repairs~

(R. 17, exhibits P-10

~

P-11) , and had some work done on the pipes on several occas;
at a total cost of $194. 97

(R.

17, exhibit P-12).

In short,

so-called improvements amounted to less than normal househo::
maintenance at a total cost of $539. 50, or an average of les
than $10.00 per month for the 55 months of plaintiff's
prior to trial.

oc~~

Courts recognize that where improvemtns maC;

to property are minor in relation to the value of such

pr~~

and are in the nature of upkeep which is to be expected of
property residents they will not provide any basis for a dee:

c=

specific performance.

See, e.g., Anderson v. l'lhipple, 7l

Idaho 112, 227 P.2d 351 (1951).

The trial court in the

instant case was certainly justified in finding that the ck
improvements were so insignificient that they could by no me:
be held to constitute actions which altered Coleman's posit::
to such an extent that giving effect to the statute of

fr~~

would impact inequitably upon him.
It should be borne in mind that in reviewing a judgment
of the district court in an action for specific performance:
Court should reverse only if persuaded that the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings.

Timpanogos Hi~

Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481 (Utah 1975); Coombs v. ouzoun~
24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970).

Where, as here, the

testimony and evidence presented by the plaintiff himself 5 ~
that he made only the most insignificiant improvements on
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the property where he resided and that he was in substantial
default of his obligations even under the terms of the agreement he alleged to have been made, there is no basis in equity
for a court to avoid the clear pronouncement of the statute of
frauds and decree specific enforcement.
Furthermore, because this is an equity action and this
Court is at liberty to review the facts presented to determine
if they are sufficient to support a decree of specific performance, the respondent asserts that there was a complete
failure by appellant to establish the terms of the alleged
oral contract by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony or
to show that such terms were mutually understood by the
parties as required by Utah law.
The only proof of the existence of the contract upon which
plaintiff relied was his own assertion of the substance of a
conversation he allegedly had with the defendant.

Mr. Dillman

denied that the conversation was as the plaintiff alleged and
affirmatively represented that an oral lease agreement was
reached.

On such a record, there can be no question that

the plaintiff failed to establish the threshold prerequisite
for the relief sought.
The plaintiff in declaring specific performance
of an oral contract must establish the terms
thereof with a greater degree of certainty than
is required in an action at law, and he must
show a clear mutual understanding and a positive agreement of both parties to the terms
of the contract.
(emphasis added)
Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 102, 106, 339 P.2d 101 (1959);
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Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502, 504

(1929).

It is noteworthy that in the cases decided by this Cour:
wherein specific performance of an oral contract concerning
land has been granted, the existence of the oral agreement
has been admitted by the defendant.

When the defendant deni;

the existence of such an oral agreement, as in the case at
bar, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the agreement
by other competent evidence before he can attempt to invoke
the doctrine of part performance.

As indicated in Note,

The Doctrine of Part Performance as Aoplied to Oral Land
Cc~t=ac~s

in Utah, 9 Utah L.Rev. 91, 106

(1964),

admission by the defendant is, of course,
the best parol proof.
Short of this, a writing
containing the terms of the contract, though
insufficient to satisfy the Statute, would
provide the next best evidence.
If no
writing of any kind is available, the terms
of the contract would have to be established
by the testimony of disinterested witnesses.
An

Plaintiff has not proffered any of these three species of
evidence and therefore has failed to provide proof of this
vital first element, thereby forfeiting any claim for specif:
performance.

The need for clear proof of the oral contract

is underscored by an additional requirement in actions for
specific performance based upon part performance; namely,
that the actions of the plaintiff which are claimed as part
performance are exclusivelv referrable to the oral contract.
In the landmark Utah case of Price v. Llovd, 31 Utah 86,
86 P. 767 (1906), and again in the recent Holmgren Brothe0_'
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supra, this Court has held that alleged acts of part performance
cannot be relied upon to overcome the statute of frauds unless
they are acts which clearly were taken as a direct result of
the oral contract and would not have been taken for any other
reason.

Where, as in the case at bar, the acts claimed as

part performance (taking possession, making some monthly
payment and making minor repairs on the property) are just
as consistent with a lease arrangement as with a contract for
sale they cannot be relied upon either as evidence of the
agreement or to support a finding of sufficient performance
to remove the bar of the statute.
The trial court did not address this contention because it
felt that the quality of proof regarding the oral contract was
a question which need not be reached given the inadequate
performance of Mr. Coleman even under his own assertion of the
terms of the agreement.

However, the respondent respectfully

submits that a review of the evidence presented shows this
to be a second adequate basis to affirm the judgment entered
by the court below.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of a jury trial in an action for
specific performance was in accord with the established law
of this jurisdiction in equity cases and does not constitute
reversable error.

While sitting as an equity court it was

wholly appropriate for the trial court to find, on the evidence
presented, that the appellant's acts of part performance had
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had raised no equities in his favor sufficient to support a
decree of specific performance without even resolving the qu,
of the existence of the alleged contract.

However, the

e~~

presented failed to establish the terms of the purported ora:
contract in the manner this Court has indicated is necessaD
and this failure provides an additional basis upon which
judgment of the court below can be supported.

t~

For these

reasons the respondent respectfully requests that the

judgm~

of the trial court be affirmed.
DATED this

day of August, 1980.

M. David Eckersley
BLACK & MOORE
500 Ten West Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondent
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